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In Defense of Brandenburg




In the United States, full-throated advocacy—even
advocacy of violence—is protected by the First Amendment of
the Constitution.1 Few other countries are as protective of
speech generally, and speech about violence or other unlawful
activity specifically. I have seen this difference in approach
firsthand. For nearly six years, I worked as an international
legal advisor helping governments throughout Africa to improve
their laws governing association, assembly, and expression. In
nearly every country in which I worked, the prospect of allowing
individuals and organizations to openly advocate for criminality
was a non-starter. But the consequences of this more restrictive
approach were real. For example, in Uganda2 and elsewhere,3
organizations focused on protecting the rights of LGBTQIA+
people were prohibited from registering with the government
because their objectives contravene existing law. My belief that
advocacy of unpopular, and even criminalized, ideas must be
protected was forged in the offices of fearless activists whose
governments use all means to silence them.4 Now I work for the
† Staff Attorney – Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project, American Civil
Liberties Union. Former Legal Advisor – Africa, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law.
Thanks to BenWizner for his support and encouragement to write this essay, and tomy First
Amendment professors Brian Hauss and Vera Eidelman. Noa Yachot helped edit this piece
and invaluable research support was provided byXiangnongGeorgeWang andLauraMoraff.
Katherine Palm and the ACLU Archives Department tracked down fascinating historical
documents. Special thanks to Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton for taking the time to speak with
me for this project and for blazing the trail, and to Zachariah Keodirelang “ZK”Matthews for
showing how legal scholarship can change the world.
1 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
2 See Civic Freedom Monitor: Uganda, INT’LCTR FORNOT-FOR-PROFIT L. (Aug. 20,
2019), http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/uganda.html [https://perma.cc/5SN9-LGHV].
3 See, e.g., Tanzania Suspends NGO for ‘Promotion’ of Gay Marriage, NEWS24
(Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/tanzania-suspends-ngo-for-promotion-
of-gay-marriage-20171021 [https://perma.cc/3WQY-DCXN].
4 See Civic Freedom Monitor: Uganda, supra note 2.
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American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), an organization that
can take significant credit for the creation of modern free speech
jurisprudence in the United States. As a First Amendment Staff
Attorney, I know the power of free expression and I confront the
difficulties that come from robust protections for controversial
and even harmful speech.
The First Amendment keeps the government out of the
business of deciding which messages are acceptable, because the
government is not allowed to regulate speech on the basis of the
viewpoints expressed.5 This insistence that the government
abstain from viewpoint discrimination can be hard to accept when
the viewpoints expressed are abhorrent to some or many people.
Even in the United States, though, not all speech is protected.
Harassment, true threats, fighting words, and obscenity are
categories of “unprotected” speech that we allow the government
more leeway in regulating.6 Incitement to lawlessness is another
distinct category of unprotected speech.7
This essay focuses on incitement as a legal doctrine, which
sometimes, but not always, involves hateful speech. Our legal
system uses a limited definition of incitement, requiring that a
speaker have intent to cause lawless action that is likely to occur
imminently. This high bar for criminalizing speech that may incite
others to violence—the “Brandenburg test”—was articulated by
the Supreme Court inBrandenburg v. Ohio, an ACLU case. In that
case, the Court struck down an Ohio state law that criminalized
“mere advocacy” of violence.8
Thedefendant in that casewas a complicated poster-child for
protecting free speech rights—a literal hood-wearing member of the
Ku Klux Klan who had been indicted based on a videotaped speech
he delivered.9 In 1968, at the height of the civil rightsmovement, the
ACLU took on Clarence Brandenburg’s case and argued on his
behalf in the Supreme Court because it presented an opportunity to
limit incitement doctrine and protect unpopular and fiery rhetoric.10
5 SeeRosenberger v. Rector andVisitors ofUniv. of Va., 515U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995).
6 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012).
7 “Hate speech” is not a category recognized in our legal system because it would
require the government to discriminate based on viewpoint. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct.
1744, 1764 (2017). For examples of how problematic hate speech laws can be, see Glenn
Greenwald, In Europe, Hate Speech Laws Are Often Used to Suppress and Punish Left-
wing Viewpoints, INTERCEPT (Aug. 29, 2017, 11:42 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/08/
29/in-europe-hate-speech-laws-are-often-used-to-suppress-and-punish-left-wing-
viewpoints/ [https://perma.cc/E4HQ-HMQB].
8 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam).
9 See id. at 444–46.
10 See The Successes of the American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU, https://
www.aclu.org/successes-american-civil-liberties-union [https://perma.cc/D6DP-6D5V].
2019] IN DEFENSE OF BRANDENBURG 17
The decision to defend Brandenburg was controversial at
that time, and the ACLU’s defense of offensive speech continues to
rankle many of its allies to this day.11 Notably, the two ACLU
lawyers on theSupremeCourt briefwere the long-time legal director
Melvin Wulf, a Jewish man, and Eleanor Holmes Norton, a young
black woman who would go on to work for decades in public service,
including nearly thirty years as a Congressperson.12 So what would
have led a self-described civil rights advocate like Eleanor Holmes
Norton to defend Clarence Brandenburg’s right to spew racial and
anti-Semitic hatred? As she recently explained:
I relished those cases, because I knew that the left and civil rights
activists were the primary users of free speech, so the racist cases
made our principled arguments even stronger. My friends at SNCC,
the Student Nonviolent Coordination Committee, were not always
convinced by this approach because “what’s sauce for the goose would
not have the same flavor for the gander.” But I knew we were winning
all those cases because we were winning for both sides.13
Fifty years later, the ACLU is confronting new challenges
to incitement doctrine, including some that have emerged online.
The internet has created enormous platforms for the advocacy of
violence, including violence in furtherance of hateful ideologies,
especially via social media.14 It may seem entirely reasonable for
policymakers and law enforcement officials to try to prevent
violence before it starts, but establishing a causal link between
speech and violence can be a tricky proposition. According to the
Brandenburg test, the government can only punish someone for
speech that incites violence if it can prove that the speaker
intended for unlawful violence to occur, that unlawful violence is
likely to occur, and that the unlawful violence is imminent.15 But
what do “intent,” “likelihood,” or “imminence” mean in relation to
a tweet or Facebook post? Is the Brandenburg test obsolete?
11 See, e.g., Jeannie Suk Gerson,Donald Trump, the A.C.L.U., and the Ongoing
Battle over the Legitimacy of Free Speech, NEWYORKER (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.new
yorker.com/news/our-columnists/donald-trump-the-aclu-and-the-ongoing-battle-over-
the-legitimacy-of-free-speech [https://perma.cc/8BE9-FR64].
12 See Defender of Unpopular Causes, EBONY, Jan. 1969, at 37, 37–38;
Landmark Case Set Precedent on Advocating Force, FREEDOM F. INST., https://www.
freedomforuminstitute.org/2009/06/09/landmark-case-set-precedent-on-advocating-
force/ [https://perma.cc/LY2A-DAD7]; Full Biography, NORTON.HOUSE.GOV, https://
norton.house.gov/about/full-biography [https://perma.cc/ZR3S-HKC9].
13 Telephone Interview with Eleanor Holmes Norton, Congresswoman for Wash.,
D.C.,U.S.House ofRepresentatives (June 6, 2019) [hereinafter InterviewwithEleanorNorton].
14 See, e.g., VICTORIAL. KILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45713, TERRORISM,
VIOLENT EXTREMISM, AND THE INTERNET: FREE SPEECH CONSIDERATIONS 2 (2019); Cass
Sunstein, Is Violent Speech a Right?, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), https://prospect.
org/justice/violent-speech-right/ [https://perma.cc/T6BR-EC7D].
15 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam).
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In this essay, I argue that the guiding principles established
by Brandenburg have served us well and should not be abandoned.
This position is argued from the perspective of a practitioner. While
the views and experiences expressed here are my own, it should not
be surprising that nothing in this essay deviates from the ACLU’s
long-standing policy position regarding incitement, a doctrine the
organization played a key role in creating.16
In Part I, theBrandenburg case is put in context within the
ACLU as it existed at the time, highlighting the experience of
Eleanor Holmes Norton. Part II traces the legacy of Brandenburg
and the application of incitement doctrine over the last fifty years
through a sampling of cases litigated by the ACLUand others. Part
III addresses the new challenge to incitement doctrine posed by
online speech. Part IV draws lessons from Africa that illuminate
the risks associated with alternate approaches.
I. THE ACLU AND BRANDENBURG
A. The ACLU at (Almost) Fifty
In 1968, when the Brandenburg case came through the
door, the ACLUwas approaching its fiftieth year. The organization
was founded in 1920 by Roger Baldwin, Crystal Eastman, and
Albert DeSilver to address the government’s repression of dissent
after theUnited States enteredWorldWar I.17 The ACLU’s earliest
causes were defending radicals and non-interventionists who were
prosecuted under the Espionage Act of 1917.18 Under this law,
“obstruct[ion]” of the war effort was criminalized.19 The
Department of Justice interpreted the law to prohibit almost any
speech critical of U.S. war strategy.20 Pamphlets spreading anti-
war and radical labor messages were prohibited by the Post Office,
including mailers sent by the Civil Liberties Bureau, a precursor
to the ACLU.21 Socialist Party leaders, including Eugene Debs,
Charles Schenck, and Elizabeth Baer were among the thousands
16 See Laura Weinrib, Rethinking the Myth of the Modern First Amendment, in THE
FREESPEECHCENTURY48, 54–59, 61–66 (Lee C. Bollinger &Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2019).
17 About the ACLU, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/about-aclu [https://perma.cc/
6HCN-QA8C].
18 See ACLU History: Advocating for Justice at the Supreme Court, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-history-advocating-justice-supreme-court [https://perma.
cc/N837-RMUQ]; Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 218-19 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799).
19 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917).
20 Sam Walker, Conscientious Objectors, ACLU (June 28, 2019), https://www.
aclu.org/issues/conscientious-objectors [https://perma.cc/64L2-M9SM].
21 Id.
2019] IN DEFENSE OF BRANDENBURG 19
that were tried and convicted under the law.22 In this era, the
Supreme Court supported the government’s right to prosecute
these radicals, creating the “clear and present danger” standard for
analyzing speech in wartime.23
In 1969, the United States was again at war, this time in
Vietnam, and “radical speech” was again perceived as a threat to
the government. The ACLU remained committed to its founding
principles and took up the fight to expand First Amendment rights
to protect controversial speech. At the time, the vast majority of
“ACLU cases” were litigated by volunteer lawyers, and the national
legal staff consisted of just two full-time attorneys, Melvin Wulf,
the Legal Director, and Eleanor Holmes Norton, the Assistant
Legal Director.24 Aryeh Neier, who would go on to co-found Human
Rights Watch and serve as president of the Open Society Institute,
was the executive director,25 and Norman Dorsen, who argued
landmark civil rights cases before the Supreme Court26 and went
on to become a law professor at New York University, was the
president of the board of directors.27
Eleanor Holmes Norton stood out in several ways—she was
the youngest of the group, the only woman,28 and the only African
American. She had argued and won a First Amendment case in the
Supreme Court the previous year, Carroll v. President &
22 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212–13 (1919); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 49 (1919).
23 The Court in Schenck v. United States defined the standard as follows:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort
that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
24 See ACLU Annual Report 1964-65 (on file with the author). Today, by
comparison, there are more than one hundred attorneys on the National ACLU legal
staff and hundreds more at affiliates in all fifty states. See ACLU History, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/about/aclu-history [https://perma.cc/7MY3-F989].
25 Aryeh Neier, OPENGLOBALRIGHTS, https://www.openglobalrights.org/aryeh-
neier/ [https://perma.cc/9BFH-7QAF].
26 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1967) (juvenile due process); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 68–69 (1968) (equal protection for out-of-wedlock children); United
States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 63–64 (1971) (first abortion case in Supreme Court).
27 Susan N. Herman, Remembering Norman Dorsen, ACLU (July 21, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/remembering-norman-dorsen [https://perma.cc/3FA2-X9B2].
28 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the founder of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project,
did not join the organization until 1972, seven years after Eleanor Holmes Norton
arrived. See Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU
WOMEN’S RTS. PROJECT, https://www.aclu.org/other/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg
[https://perma.cc/BBW8-CWY8].
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Commissioners of Princess Anne.29 In that case, the Court held
unanimously that government officials could not prohibit a political
rally without giving the organizers notice and an opportunity to
appeal the decision.30 In many ways it was a classic ACLU case,
rooted in a deep suspicion of government overreach.31 But the
ACLU’s client was not a leftist like the organization’s earliest
clients.32 InCarroll,Nortonwas representing JosephCarroll and his
National States Rights Party, a white supremacist group.33
For her part, Norton says it was not hard for the ACLU
to decide to represent these clients, nor was it hard for her as a
black woman to work on the “racist cases.”34 In 1968, Aryeh
Neier approached Norton about representing segregationist
Alabama Governor George Wallace in his bid to secure a permit
to hold a rally at Shea Stadium for his presidential campaign. In
her memoir she describes the exchange like this:
Neier: “Eleanor, how would you like to go out and represent George
Wallace in court on Monday?”
Norton: “Great.”
Neier: “I was only joking!”
Norton: “I’m not.”35
Norton did go on to represent Governor Wallace—and she won.36
At about the same time, the ACLU took on the representation of
another avowedly racist client, Clarence Brandenburg.
B. Brandenburg v. Ohio—an “ACLU case”
Eleanor Holmes Norton did not argueBrandenburg v. Ohio
at the SupremeCourt, but her name appears on the briefing papers
alongwith her colleaguesMelvinWulf andNormanDorsen, aswell
as Allen Brown, an ACLU cooperating attorney from Cincinnati
who had litigated the case in state court.37 The defendant Clarence
29 See Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 175, 185
(1968). Audio of the argument is available at: Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/1968/6 [https://
perma.cc/4BNE-FFUG] (found by clicking oral argument under “Media” heading).
30 Carroll, 393 U.S. at 180–82, 185.
31 See About the ACLU, supra note 17 (“[T]he ACLU takes up the toughest civil
liberties cases and issues to defend all people from government abuse and overreach.”).
32 SeeWalker, Conscientious Objectors, supra note 20.
33 Carroll, 393 U.S. at 176.
34 Interview with Eleanor Norton, supra note 13.
35 JOAN STEINAU LESTER, FIRE IN MY SOUL: THE LIFE OF ELEANOR HOLMES
NORTON 141–42 (2003).
36 See Rupp v. Lindsay, 293 N.Y.S.2d 812, 813–14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
37 See Brief for Appellant at 33, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (No.
492), 1969 WL 136813 [hereinafter ACLU Brief]; Free Speech on the Docket:
2019] IN DEFENSE OF BRANDENBURG 21
Brandenburg, a virulently racist and anti-Semitic Ku Klux Klan
member, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism
Statute, which criminalized
advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform and . . . voluntarily
assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed
to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.38
The evidence in the case consisted of two videos filmed by
a local television reporter on June 28, 1964.39 The first video
featured ten to twenty hooded Klansmen in a field on a private
farm, many carrying guns, shouting racist and anti-Semitic slurs
and phrases, including “Bury the n*ggers[!]” and “Send the Jews
back to Israel[!]”40 A leader, later identified as Brandenburg,
addressed the group saying:
The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than does any other
organization. We’re not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our
president, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress
the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be
some revengeance [sic] taken.
We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred
thousand strong.41
The second video, shot indoors, shows six Klansmen, some of whom
are armed, shouting similarly intolerant words and includes a
slightly different version of the speech by the hooded leader.42
Brandenburg was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas,
the state trial court of general jurisdiction, in Hamilton County,
Ohio, of violating the “advocacy” and “assembly” provisions of the
criminal syndicalism statute.43 On appeal, attorney Allen Brown
Brandenburg v. Ohio, ACLU: OHIO, https://www.acluohio.org/archives/cases/branden
burg-v-ohio [https://perma.cc/HW2L-HTG8].
38 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45 (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 2923.13 (1919)).
39 See id. at 445–47; ACLU Brief, supra note 37, at 4.
40 ACLUBrief, supra note 37, at 4–5. It is as hard for author to write these words,
as it may be for the audience to read them. I include the details of Clarence Brandenburg’s
speech so as not to shy away from its ugliness and hatefulness.
41 Id. at 6.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1, 8. In a coincidence of First Amendment history, the trial judge was
Simon Leis, Sr., whose son, Simon Leis, Jr., served as a county prosecutor and won a
conviction of Larry Flynt on obscenity charges. That conviction was overturned on appeal.
The younger Leis eventually succeeded his father as a judge in the Court of Common Pleas.
See Associated Press, Ex-Prosecutor Who Took on Larry Flynt Retires, TWIN CITIES (Sept.
15, 2011, 11:01PM), https://www.twincities.com/2011/09/15/ex-prosecutor-who-took-on-
larry-flynt-to-retire/ [https://perma.cc/S98W-NKMW]; Simon L. Leis Jr., REVOLVY, https://
www.revolvy.com/page/Simon-L.-Leis-Jr. [https://perma.cc/9Z3N-KBTY].
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argued that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and as
applied because the two videos in question contained speech
protected by the First Amendment, but his position was unavailing
in state court.44 The Court of Appeals of the First Appellate District
of Ohio affirmed the conviction, and the Ohio Supreme Court
dismissed a further appeal. Brown and the ACLU petitioned the
Supreme Court of the United States and were granted certiorari
for argument during the October 1968 term.45
In its brief to the Court, the ACLU argued that Ohio’s statute
was unconstitutional on its face because it covered “mere advocacy” of
violence as an “abstract doctrine” without distinguishing that from
“advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action.”46 The ACLU also
argued that the statute criminalized peaceful “assemblage” without
any intent requirement in violation of the First Amendment47 and
that the statute in question was vague, overbroad, and
unconstitutional as applied to the defendants.48
At oral argument in the Supreme Court, Brown argued
that Clarence Brandenburg’s expression of “hyperbole self-
evidently stupid and silly,” was protected under the First
Amendment.49 Brown pointed out that Brandenburg’s claims
were ridiculous and not literal, including that “[h]e asserted that
the Klan was the largest organization in the State of Ohio,” and
that “[h]e did not specify the ‘revengeance [sic]’” he might take if
certain conditions were met.50 Brown also pointed to the jury
instruction in the state trial court, which made “no attempt to
give us . . . a line demarcation between . . . advocacy in a
hypothetical sense” and unprotected speech.51
The State of Ohio argued that the prosecution was
justified because the speech in the videos created “a clear and
present danger at the time” because it was broadcast to a wide
44 ACLU Brief, supra note 37, at 8.
45 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444 (1969) (per curiam).
46 ACLU Brief, supra note 37, at 12 (second and third quoting Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957)).
47 Id. at 20.
48 Id. While the bedrock principles argued in this case remain central to the
ACLU’s mission, the brief would be substantially different in tone if it were written today.
Notably, in support of the as applied challenge, the brief argued that the KKK was an
avowedly non-violent organization and quoted James R. Venable, the “attorney and
Imperial Wizard (President) of the National Knights of the [KKK].” Id at 7.
49 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(No. 492), https://www.supremecourt.gov/pdfs/transcripts/1968/68-492_02-27-1969.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DG7-4XTS] [hereinafter Brandenburg Oral Argument].
50 Id. at 3–4.
51 Id. at 6. Neither the trial court nor either appellate court issued an opinion in
this case, so the only record on appeal was the video, the indictment, and the jury instruction
at trial. ACLU Brief, supra note 37, at 8.
2019] IN DEFENSE OF BRANDENBURG 23
audience.52 In a memorable exchange, Leonard Kirschner,
arguing on behalf of the State of Ohio, proposed a hypothetical
to illustrate the inherent power of the words in question: “[I]f I
were to run down Harlem, shall we say, and say, ‘Bury the
Negro. Send them back to black Africa.’”53 Justice Thurgood
Marshall interjected, “You wouldn’t last very long[!]” to the
amusement of the courtroom.54
In his closing, Brown deftly picked up on this exchange,
arguing that Justice Marshall “is safe at the moment because the
venue is in Washington, DC, but in Ohio [he] could be indicted for
suggesting a violent reaction by the Negro community.”55 This
drove home the point that a broad definition of incitement
implicates vast amounts of speech that should be protected. Brown
made clear at the end of the argument that just because he thought
Brandenburg’s speech should be protected, did not indicate that he
supported the viewpoint expressed. He concluded with the
disclaimer, “I should perhaps state for the sake of the record that
counsel for the appellant in no way agrees with any of the
appellant’s positions. I will, however, take the Voltair[ian]
position56 in relation to the appellant.”57
The Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that speech can be
considered “incitement” and outside the protections of the First
Amendment only under limited circumstances that go far beyond
“mere advocacy” of violence.58 The Court relied on the idea that:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is [1] directed to inciting or
producing [2] imminent lawless action and is [3] likely to incite or
produce such action.59
This three-part test became the foundation for modern incitement
doctrine in the United States, a high bar unmatched by other legal
systems.60 This should be a point of pride because our limited
52 Id. at 30.
53 Id. at 31.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 36.
56 Historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall, writing under a pseudonym, characterized the
French philosopher, writer and historian Voltaire’s “attitude” as, “I disapprove of what you
say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” S. G. TALLENTYRE, THEFRIENDS OF
VOLTAIRE 198-99 (1906). The quote has become known as the “Voltairian position” and is
often misattributed to Voltaire himself.
57 Brandenburg Oral Argument, supra note 49, at 37.
58 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam).
59 Id. at 447.
60 Justice Douglas’ concurrence makes clear that the Court’s decision is a
repudiation of the “clear and present danger” test established by the World War I sedition
cases, Schenck, Debs, and Abrams v. United States. Justice Douglas quotes Justice Holmes’
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interpretation of incitement has given a broad variety of social
movements the freedom to breathe, as illustrated by several cases
highlighted below.
II. THE LEGACY OF BRANDENBURG
A. The Brandenburg Test
1. Intent
Intent is the primary innovation in theBrandenburg test as
compared to the “clear and present danger” doctrine, but the Court
provided little guidance in theBrandenburg opinion for determining
whether an actor has demonstrated the requisite intent for
incitement.61 The intent requirement of theBrandenburg test would
certainly be satisfied if one “authorized, directed, or ratified specific
tortious activity,”62 but advocating unlawful action in the abstract is
not enough.63 Nor is failing to exercise “exquisite care”—the speech
must actually be intended “to produce violent actions.”64 The Sixth
Circuit has noted that “[t]he hostile reaction of a crowd does not
transform protected speech into incitement,”65 and scholars have
asserted that the speaker must have “subjectively intended
incitement.”66 Burning a cross, for example, is not enough, on its
own, to satisfy the intent requirement, because the act is “not always
intended to intimidate.”67
dissent in Abrams, writing “[i]t is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to
bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where
private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change themind
of the country.” Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 451–52 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
61 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 264 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The
short per curiam opinion in Brandenburg is, by any measure, elliptical.”); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1049 (Wolters Kluwer
ed., 5th ed. 2015) (“Brandenburg does not answer . . . how imminence and likelihood are
to be appraised. . . . Nor does the Court in Brandenburg define ‘intent’ and what must be
proved to establish it.”).
62 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982).
63 See Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 450–51 (1974). The
Sixth Circuit has referred to the “first Brandenburg factor” as “specific advocacy of
violence.” Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 610 (6th Cir. 2018).
64 James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002); see Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam).
65 Bible Believers v. Wayne County., 805 F.3d 228, 246 (6th Cir. 2015).
66 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 5 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.15(d), Westlaw (database updated May 2019)
(emphasis omitted). The speech must also have “objectively” provoked imminent unlawful
conduct. Id. (emphasis omitted).
67 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365–66 (2003); see also R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (an anti-bias ordinance violated the First Amendment because
it punished expressive speech based on its content and viewpoint, and was not narrowly
tailored). The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a defendant could have been convicted for
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2. Likelihood
While the intent prong of the test is subjective, the other
two prongs are objective. In order for speech to be considered
“likely” to incite unlawful action under the Brandenburg test,
there must be a “high probability” that the incitement will be
effective.68 It is not enough for violence to be foreseeable,69 or for
the idea expressed to be provocative.70 However, exactly what a
“high probability” means and how it is calculated is subject to
considerable debate. Audience size seems to be a relevant factor
for many judges.71 That is, with a larger audience, the probability
that someone will be incited is likely to rise. But if there is a
mathematical probability that one in one million people might be
incited by a statement, is that a “high probability” in an audience
of five billion?72 Brandenburg does not provide clear answers.
3. Imminence
The Brandenburg test requires that speech is intended to,
and likely will, produce imminent illegal action,73 which the Ninth
Circuit has interpreted as “violence or physical disorder in the
nature of a riot.”74 In order tomeet the imminence requirement, the
burning a cross if he had met each element of the Brandenburg test, namely if he had
done so “with the intent to advocate the use of force or violence and if the burning was
likely to produce such action,” or if the intent was to threaten nearby residents, or cause
them to “to reasonably fear the imminent use of force or violence.” United States v.
McDermott, 29 F.3d 404, 406 (8th Cir. 1994).
68 Collin v. Chi. Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 753 (7th Cir. 1972).
69 See James, 300 F.3d at 699 (“[I]t is a long leap from the proposition that [the
defendant’s] actions were foreseeable to the Brandenburg requirement that the violent
content was ‘likely’ to cause [him] to behave this way.”).
70 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408–09 (1989) (holding that flag burning
is not likely to produce lawless action and the Supreme Court has “not permitted the
government to assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot”).
71 Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas all asked about the size of Clarence
Brandenburg’s audience in person and on television. Brandenburg Oral Argument, supra
note 49, at 6, 8, 11, 15, 21.
72 Thanks to Jon Callas for drawing my attention to this line of inquiry.
73 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); see also United
States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 483 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[R]eliance on Brandenburg to justify
an injunction banning ‘materials designed to incite others to violate the law’—without
reference to imminence—is erroneous.”).
74 White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000). In truth, incitement doctrine
also applies to other illegal activity, such as tax evasion, but in those cases the analysis is
usually closer to aiding and abetting or criminal conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v.
Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 624 (8th Cir. 1978) (“Although the speeches here do not incite the
type of imminent lawless activity referred to in criminal syndicalism cases, the defendants
did go beyond mere advocacy of tax reform. They explained how to avoid withholding and
their speeches and explanations incited several individuals to activity that violated federal
law and had the potential of substantially hindering the administration of the revenue.
This speech is not entitled to first amendment protection and . . . was sufficient action to
constitute aiding and abetting the filing of false or fraudulent withholding forms.”).
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lapse between speech and conduct must be shorter than “weeks or
months”75 and must amount to something “more than advocacy of
illegal action at some indefinite future time.”76 The Third Circuit
has held that three weeks was not imminent enough.77 The Sixth
Circuit has held, in reference to the psychological effects of violent
media, that a “glacial process of personality development is far
from the temporal imminence . . . required to satisfy the
Brandenburg test.”78
The speech and the unlawful conduct must also be
directly connected to each other.79 Words cannot be punished for
having a “mere tendency . . . to encourage unlawful acts.”80
However, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme
Court held that the federal material support for terrorism
statute is constitutional even though it implicated non-profit
organizations’ efforts to teach conflict resolution to designated
terrorist groups.81 The case is noteworthy, as it represents the
only time the Court has upheld a statute restricting political
speech after applying strict scrutiny.82However, Justice Breyer’s
dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, argues that
the statute fails the Brandenburg test because:
[T]he First Amendment protects advocacy even of unlawful action so long
as that advocacy is not “directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.” Here the
plaintiffs seek to advocate peaceful, lawful action to secure political ends;
and they seek to teach others how to do the same. No one contends that
the plaintiffs’ speech to these organizations can be prohibited as
incitement under Brandenburg.83
The Fourth Circuit has noted that the
“imminence” requirement . . . generally poses little obstacle to the
punishment of speech that constitutes criminal aiding and abetting,
75 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
76 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam); see also McCoy v.
Stewart, 282 F.3d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n Hess v. Indiana, the Court made explicit
what was implicit in Brandenburg: a state cannot constitutionally sanction ‘advocacy of
illegal action at some indefinite future time.’” (citation omitted)).
77 United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 n.10 (3d Cir. 2009) (“These events
occurred a minimum of three weeks apart, which does not meet the ‘imminence’ required
by the Brandenburg standard.”).
78 James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002).
79 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928.
80 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002); see also Hess, 414 U.S.
at 109 (“[W]ords could not be punished by the State on the ground that they had a tendency
to lead to violence.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
81 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2010).
82 EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES:
PROBLEM, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 259 (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 2011).
83 Holder, 561 U.S. at 43–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)).
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because “culpability in such cases is premised, not on defendants’
‘advocacy’ of criminal conduct, but on defendants’ successful efforts to
assist others by detailing to them the means of accomplishing the
crimes.”84
B. Brandenburg as Applied
Prosecutions for incitement are relatively rare,85 but the
ACLU has used the Brandenburg test in numerous cases over
the years. The ACLU and other First Amendment advocates
have long argued that precedents set by representing
objectionable clients can help hold the line for anyone who
expresses views that are disdained by government.86 Fourteen
years after Brandenburg, the oft-maligned theory of trickle-
down justice was on full display.
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the Supreme Court
considered whether civil rights organizer Charles Evers could be
held liable for making an “impassioned plea for black citizens to
unify” by boycotting white-owned businesses in Claiborne County,
Mississippi.87 According to witnesses, Evers said, “If we catch any
of you going in them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn
neck.”88 The Court held that “[t]he emotionally charged rhetoric of
Charles Evers’ speeches did not transcend the bounds of protected
speech set forth inBrandenburg.”89 Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, addressed some of the jarring language Evers’ used,
explaining that “[s]trong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric
cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases.”90 He went on
to state “[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with
84 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 264 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF BOMBMAKING INFORMATION, THE EXTENT
TO WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CONTROLLED BY FEDERAL LAW, AND THE EXTENT TO
WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAY BE SUBJECT TO REGULATION CONSISTENT WITH THE
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THEUNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 37 (Apr. 1997)).
85 See When Hate Speech Leads to Violence, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. (Mar. 8,
2018), https://www.russellsage.org/news/when-hate-speech-leads-violence [https://perma.
cc/FG85-CJP4] (“The record of prosecutions for incitement is relatively meager, and this
results in part from the fact that the test for incitement is quite demanding and requires
that the prosecution show that the defendant intended to directly advocate a crime and
that crime was likely to occur imminently.”).
86 See e.g., ACLU Board Policy #46 which reads, in part, “although the
democratic standards in which the ACLU believes and for which it fights run directly
counter to the philosophy of the Klan and other ultra-right groups, the vitality of the
democratic institutions the ACLU defends lies in their equal application to all.” ACLU
CASE SELECTION GUIDELINES: CONFLICTS BETWEEN COMPETING VALUES OR PRIORITIES 2,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_case_selection_guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QVU5-B95E].
87 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 926–28 (1982).
88 Id. at 902.
89 Id. at 928.
90 Id.
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spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a
common cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless action,
they must be regarded as protected speech.”91 In short, the Court
held that if Clarence Brandenburg had the right to implore action
to accomplish his unpopular aims, so must Charles Evers.92
More recently, three illustrative cases show how the
Brandenburg test has been applied to protect opposing viewpoints.
InMarch 2016, presidential candidate Donald Trump, in front of an
audience of rowdy supporters, shouted “Get ‘em out of here” in
reference to protesters who were subsequently manhandled.93 This
would seem to be a tailor-made situation for passing the
Brandenburg test, but Trump also told his supporters, “Don’t hurt
‘em,” which led the ACLU to conclude in a blog post that Trump’s
words did not meet the “high bar” set by the court.94 Eventually, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the record did not include
“a single word in Trump’s speech that could be perceived as
encouraging violence or lawlessness,” and therefore his speech was
protected under the First Amendment.95
In March 2019, the ACLU filed a facial challenge to South
Dakota’s so-called “riot boosting” laws.96 This legislation is aimed
at indigenous, environmental, and civil rights protesters who
oppose the Keystone XL pipeline and other extractive industry
projects.97 The laws create special penalties for advocating for
unlawful action, but contain none of the safeguards mandated by
Brandenburg. Subjective intent is not required, nor is objective
likeliness of the unlawful activity, nor is imminence a
requirement.98 In September 2019, the District Court granted a
91 Id.
92 InClaiborne, the Court also held that nonviolent boycotts are a form of protected
speech. Id. at 911. Support for this principle was the thrust of an ACLU amicus brief in the
case. See Brief for ACLU as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458U.S. 886 (1982) (No. 81-202), 1981WL390220. This finding has been used
to defend a wide variety of boycott advocates, including, most recently and prominently,
Palestinian rights groups. See Amawi v. Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 3d 717,
763–64 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (granting a preliminary injunction against a Texas law prohibiting
state entities from contracting with companies and independent contractors that boycott
Israel because the boycott is protected speech under the First Amendment).




95 Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 610–12 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
96 Andrew Malone & Vera Eidelman, The South Dakota Legislature Has




98 ACLU to Argue in U.S. District Court on Wednesday in Challenge to South
Dakota Anti-Protest Laws, ACLU (June 7, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/
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preliminary injunction blocking the laws from being enforced,
finding the laws deficient on a number of grounds, including that
“they fail to meet the Brandenburg requirements.”99 The District
Court’s ruling highlighted the constitutional infirmity of the riot-
boosting laws and South Dakota subsequently signed an
agreement precluding the state from enforcing them.100 This was
an important victory for the free speech rights of indigenous and
environmental activists.
Finally, an important ongoing case involves DeRay
Mckesson,101 an activist associated with the Black Lives Matter
movement.102 In November of 2016, Mckesson was sued in the
Middle District of Louisiana by an unnamed Baton Rouge police
officer for injuries the officer suffered during a protest purportedly
organized by Mckesson and Black Lives Matter that had occurred
the previous July and included civil disobedience in the form of
marching in a street without a permit.103 During that protest, an
unknown person threw an object, injuring the police officer. The
complaint alleges liability on the part of Mckesson and Black Lives
Matter on theories of negligence, arguing that violence against the
police was a “foreseeable” consequence of leading protesters into
the street; respondeat superior, implying that protesters were
under the control of organizers to the extent that organizers could
be held liable for protesters actions; and civil conspiracy, alleging
without evidence that organizers were part of a concerted plan “to
riot.”104 In September of 2017, the District Court dismissed the suit
for failure to state a plausible claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that:
The only public speech to which Plaintiff cites in his Complaint is a one-
sentence statement that Mckesson allegedly made to The New York
Times: “The police want protestors to be too afraid to protest.” Mckesson’s
statement does not advocate—or make any reference to—violence of
any kind, and even if the statement did, “mere advocacy of the use of
force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of the
First Amendment.” This statement falls far short of being “likely to
aclu-argue-us-district-court-wednesday-challenge-south-dakota-anti-protest-laws
[https://perma.cc/2SUD-3YC2].
99 Dakota Rural Action v. Noem, No. 5:19-cv-05026-LLP, 2019 WL 4464388, at
*4, *13 (D.S.D. Sept. 18, 2019) (internal citation omitted).
100 Stephen R. Groves, South Dakota, ACLU Settle Lawsuit over ‘Riot-Boosting’
Laws, AP NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019), https://apnews.com/8376dc9556c945eb9c8700b050ae2446
[https://perma.cc/7FF5-MPEB].
101 Full disclosure: the ACLU is serving as co-counsel to DeRay Mckesson on a
petition for certiorari in this case.
102 SeeDoe v.Mckesson, 272 F. Supp. 3d 841, 844–45 (M.D. La. 2017), aff ’d in part,
rev’d in part and remanded, 922 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2019), opinion withdrawn and superseded
on reh’g, and aff ’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 935 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2019).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 845.
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incite lawless action,” which Plaintiff would have to prove to
hold Mckesson liable based on his public speech.
Nor can Plaintiff premise Mckesson’s liability on the theory that
he allegedly “did nothing to calm the crowd.” As the United States
Supreme Court stated inNAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886 (1982), “[c]ivil liability may not be imposed merely because an
individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed
acts of violence[.]”105
Officer Doe appealed the district court decision to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the lower
court’s decision in part, finding that the negligence claim against
Mckesson should proceed.106 Upon a panel rehearing, in August
2019, the Fifth Circuit doubled down on its previous opinion,
finding that “Mckesson’s conduct [,,,]was not necessarily protected
by the First Amendment.”107 The Fifth Circuit did find that there
were no alleged facts to support a “conspiracy ‘to incite a
riot/protest’” claim because Mckesson was not alleged to have
“colludedwith the unknown assailant to attackOfficerDoe or knew
of the attack and specifically ratified it.”108
But the court also found that if, as alleged, Mckesson
“intentionally led the demonstrators to block the highway”—a
crime under Louisiana law109—it was “patently foreseeable” that
the police would be required to respond to the “intentional
lawlessness” by protestors by clearing the highway.110 So, the court
reasoned, “Mckesson should have known that leading the
demonstrators onto a busy highway was most nearly certain to
provoke a confrontation between police and the mass of
demonstrators, yet he ignored the foreseeable danger to officers,
bystanders, and demonstrators.”111 The court highlighted that
Claiborne stands for the proposition that “[t]he First Amendment
does not protect violence,” and “Claiborne Hardware does not
insulate the petitioner from liability for his own negligent conduct
simply because he, and those he associated with, also intended to
communicate a message.”112 The implications of this line of
105 Id. at 847–48 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
106 Doe v. Mckesson, 922 F.3d 604, 614 (5th Cir.), opinion withdrawn and superseded
on reh’g, and aff ’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 935 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2019).
107 Doe v. Mckesson, 935 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2019).
108 Id. at 260–61. In a twist of historical irony, in consideringMckesson’s vicarious
liability, the Fifth Circuit relied on Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 that states that
“[m]asters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and
overseers.” Id. at 259–60 (quoting LA. CIV. CODEANN. art. 2320).
109 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:97.
110 Mckesson, 935 F.3d at 261.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 262–63 (alteration in original) (first quoting N.A.A.C.P v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)).
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reasoning are dire for protests involving civil disobedience, since
organizers might be held responsible for other protesters’ unlawful
conduct without any indication that the organizer was even aware
of the conduct. This decision113 is a stark departure from
established incitement doctrine and should be corrected as soon as
possible.
This brief sampling of cases demonstrates how a robust
incitement doctrine can and should protect a variety of political
speech. Of course, white supremacy, patriarchy and other forms of
oppression and bias are endemic in our society and legal system,
and First Amendment law is not exempt from this reality. The
powerful will always be more successful at vindicating their rights.
But incitement doctrine, and free speech more generally, has been
a demonstrably vital tool for all social movements in the United
States, including progressive messages that challenge state and
corporate power.
III. THE BRANDENBURG TESTONLINE
Some commentators have suggested that online speech is
categorically different from traditional forms of speech and therefore
incitement doctrine needs to be fundamentally reconsidered.114
These commentators generally point to horrific violence that was
carried out after perpetrators discussed their ideas and plans
online.115 The thinking generally goes that fewer protections for
hateful and incendiary speech might lead to less violence.116 While
there is far too much violence and suffering in our world, it fair to
say that there is no epidemic of online incitement to violence or
lawlessness.117Data shows that in relation tomost of humanhistory,
113 OnDecember 16, 2019, the Fifth Circuit withdrew its revised opinion and issued
a new opinion with the same ruling, along with a dissent by JudgeWillets. Sarah Lustbader,
A Conservative Judge Changes His Mind, APPEAL (Dec. 19, 2019), https://theappeal.org/a-
conservative-judge-changes-his-mind/ [https://perma.cc/EZE2-9XDQ]
114 See, e.g., John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The
Framework for an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 428, 466
(2002); Scott Hammack, Note, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line
Requires a Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 67 (2002).
115 See e.g., Andrew Marantz, Free Speech Is Killing Us: Noxious Language




117 In India and Myanmar, among other places, social media has been used to
amplify calls for violence, but taking into account the vast amount of communication that
takes place online, violence is rare. See Timothy McLaughlin, How WhatsApp Fuels Fake
News and Violence in India, WIRED (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/how-
whatsapp-fuels-fake-news-and-violence-in-india/ [https://perma.cc/AH2X-Y4PP]; Alexandra
Stevenson, Facebook Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myanmar, N.Y.
32 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1
we live in exceptionally peaceful times.118 But the basic principles at
the foundation of modern incitement doctrine remain even in the
digital age. A fundamental commitment to equal rights, combined
with a healthy skepticism of governmental authority, requires
speech be protected, even if it is distasteful and even if it is online.
Intent, imminence, and likelihood are still central tenets for a just
doctrine. As Daniel Kobil has argued, “evaluating provocative
Internet speech under a standard that is more relaxed than
Brandenburg is simply not justified by the ‘new dangers’ posed by
this powerful medium.”119 So what does the Brandenburg test look
like as it has been applied to online speech?
A. Intent
While the Supreme Court has not considered intent in an
incitement case involving online speech, it has analyzed intent in
the closely analogous context of true threats. In Elonis v. United
States, Anthony Elonis posted a long series of publicly accessible
messages on Facebook listing several things he said would be
illegal, such as “Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want
to kill my wife?” and more specific descriptions of how someone
could kill his wife, framed in the same “it would be illegal for me
to say” structure.120 When his wife saw the post she became
“extremely afraid” and she was granted a protective order against
Elonis.121 Elonis went on to discuss his desire to carry out a school
shooting.
The FBI became aware of his posts and charged him with
multiple counts, including making threats of violence. In the
district court, the jury was instructed that it need only consider
whether Elonis intentionally made the statements, not whether
he intended to make a threat.122 Elonis argued that the
prosecution was unconstitutional because the government
should have been required to prove actual intent to make a
threat.123 In its amicus brief, the ACLU cited Brandenburg and
Claiborne arguing that the specific intent requirement from
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/myanmar-facebook.
html [https://perma.cc/M7CE-UFBG].
118 See generally STEPHEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY
VIOLENCEHASDECLINED (2011) (arguing that data indicates that violence has decreased
over time globally, despite widespread perceptions to the contrary).
119 Daniel T. Kobil, Advocacy on Line: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Speech in the
Internet Era, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 227, 250 (2000).
120 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005 (2015).
121 Id. at 2006.
122 Id. at 2006–07.
123 Id. at 2007.
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incitement doctrine should be applied to threats.124 Eventually,
the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment requires
prosecutors to prove that the defendant intended to issue threats
or knew that communications would be viewed as threats,
because “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.”125 Elonis
was an important decision because online speech is
characteristically free-wheeling and sarcastic, so discerning
actual intent is all the more important before criminalizing
speech. At a minimum, the intent requirement should apply
with equal force online. In the case of Anthony Elonis, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals eventually ruled his actual intent was
clear and therefore the faulty jury instruction was a harmless
error and his conviction was upheld.126
B. Likelihood
The likelihood prong of the Brandenburg test has also been
criticized for being ill-fitted to the internet, especially given the
unpredictable audience for online speech.127 Likelihood is primarily
about how any listener would respond, but courts can, and do,
consider the size of the audience. Concerning online speech, the
potential, though distinctly unlikely, audience may be billions of
people. But likelihood analysis and the related inquiry about
potential audience need not change based on the mode of
communication the speaker uses. As technology changes, courts
need simply to consider the likelihood of unlawful conduct in
context. Any new rule that relaxes the likelihood requirement with
regard to online speech would weaken the required nexus between
speech and unlawful action. Such a rule would swallow the intent
and imminence standards and chill vast amounts of speech for fear
of an unlikely future action by another person.
C. Imminence
Proving imminence may be a more complicated prospect
with online speech, but critics tend to overstate the novelty of the
problem. The “Nuremburg Files” case is illustrative.128 In that
case, the American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA), an anti-
124 Brief of ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20–21, Elonis
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), 2014 WL 4215752.
125 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012 (quoting Morissette v United States, 342 U.S.
246, 252 (1952)).
126 United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 591–92 (3d Cir. 2016).
127 Cronan, supra note 114, at 452.
128 See generally Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal.
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).
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abortion group, posted a list of abortion providers’ names and
personal information on a website that made no direct or explicit
threats, but created the strong implication that the postings were
a “hit list.”129 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, found that the
implied threat was enough to render the speech unprotected
under the true threat doctrine.130 While the majority did not deal
explicitly with the question of imminence, separate dissenting
opinions invoked Brandenburg and Claiborne to argue that
ACLA’s speech was abhorrent but protected.131
This case highlights the relationship between the speaker
and audience online, where there might be a long delay between
when a message is sent and when it is received, and people can
communicate across vast distances. Perhaps the most compelling
speech-protective recommendation made by critics of current
doctrine is that the imminence analysis should take into account the
perspective of the listener.132 That is, it should notmatter only when
a post was published, but also when it was read in relation to the
unlawful activity.133 This adaptation could preserve the principle of
the imminently responsive audience behind Brandenburg, while
accounting for massive telecommunication advances. The risk that
people might become liable for the delayed impact of years-old posts
is mitigated by the fact that it would likewise be difficult to prove
intent with sufficient specificity years later. Still, the impact of such
a change requires further consideration.
IV. LESSONS FROM AFRICA
Free speech protections are uniquely robust in the United
States. Provocative and controversial political views on all sides are
protected from government intervention, even when expressed with
fiery language. For anyone who has ever disagreed with the
government, this is a very good thing. But our approach can
undoubtedly lead to some undesirable outcomes. Violent and often
hateful rhetoric can spread without government impediment and
shape national debate in ugly and harmful ways. Society is not
without tools of redress short of official prohibition, though: Social
ridicule by private actors for objectionable ideas is protected by the
First Amendment, as is denial of access to private spaces.134
129 Id. at 1088.
130 Id. at 1086.
131 See id. at 1090, 1092 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); id. at 1111, 1121 (Berzon, J.,
dissenting).
132 See, e.g, Cronan, supra note 114, at 455.
133 Id.
134 Social media platforms, as private entities, are not beholden to the First
Amendment which only applies to government action. The wisdom of comprehensive
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While working as a legal advisor on freedom of association,
assembly, and expression in Africa, I saw what happens when
governments have broad authority to prohibit speech. InRwanda, in
reaction to the 1994 genocide during which kill orders were issued
via radio, Paul Kagame’s government passed laws criminalizing
incitement to, and denial of, genocide in broad terms.135 In practice,
anyone who challenges the government’s narrative of the genocide
or any other issue is subject to arrest. Countless opponents of the
government have been charged under this law, and Rwandans have
come to understand that the only way to stay safe is to stay silent.136
Anyone who thinks, “That could never happen here,” fails to
appreciate how quickly and deeply norms can change. In 2015,
Tanzania, a country that had become a regionalmodel of democratic
governance and tolerance,137 passed aCybercrimes Law that banned
a broad range of online speech.138 Ostensibly designed to address
incitement, child pornography, misinformation, financial fraud, and
cyber bullying, the law has been used to crack down on criticism of
the government. In 2017 a private citizen was convicted under the
Cybercrimes Act for calling the president an “imbecile” on social
media.139 Independent media outlets and journalists have also been
arrested and penalized under the law.140 Tanzania went from a
burgeoning democracy to a closed political system in the space of less
than five years.
monitoring and censorship on privately run platforms is a topic of vibrant debate, but it
falls outside of this analysis of the First Amendment’s incitement doctrine. For its part,
the ACLU has sounded a warning about trusting private social media platforms to fairly
police speech. See Vera Eidelman, Facebook Shouldn’t Censor Offensive Speech, ACLU
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137 Tanzania’s ratings in Freedom House’s annual “Freedom in the World”
report peaked between 2011-15 when it was rated 3.0 (1 being most free, 7 being least
free). Since 2015, the country’s rating has consistently declined and in 2019 was 4.5. See
Freedom in the World, FREEDOMHOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-
world [https://perma.cc/43FR-GGHX].
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CONCLUSION
Protecting speech we do not like is not easy. For a century,
ACLU attorneys have understood both how hard it can be to
represent people with loathsome views, and how important it is to
have a doctrine that protects fiery political rhetoric no matter the
speaker. Eleanor Holmes Norton’s friends asked her, “Don’t you
know that what’s good sauce for the goose doesn’t taste the same
for the gander?”141 But as clearly as she understood the deep
scourge that racism had wrought in our country, she also
understood that neutral rules are necessary to protect
marginalized voices.142 Hateful speech, so long as it does not rise to
the level of incitement or other unprotected categories, is not
prohibited under our legal system in large part because we do not
trust the government to regulate unpopular views.
If we were to concede that online speech is a special kind
of problem that requires additional government intervention to
curb harmful rhetoric, it is not hard to imagine how such a
principle might be enforced by a government—here or abroad—
that does not respect universal human rights or norms of
democratic discourse. Brandenburg’s speech was horrifying, but
Brandenburg is good law and its underlying logic remains a just
and democratic lodestar.
141 Interview with Eleanor Norton, supra 13.
142 Id.
